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I INTRODUCTION 
The recent decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Cox & Coxon Ltd v Leipst1 
has favoured remedial coherence and has adhered to suggestions that the traditional 
approach should not be lightly disregarded.2 By the majority of 3:2, the Court of Appeal 
has decided that expectation losses are not recoverable under the Fair Trading Act 1986 
for losses incurred through misleading conduct amounting to misrepresentation and 
inducing entry into a contract. 3 The decision has achieved consistency with Australian 
jurisprudence4 and does not "jettison hard-earned intellectual capital carefully evolved by 
judges over several centuries". 5 A major point of law has been settled, but split 3:2,6 the 
decision has not had the commanding authority some might have expected. Referred to as 
a "complete reversal"7 and a "major change in approach", 8 the decision has been 
reluctantly accepted by some legal commentators. 
In this article I focus on whether expectation damages should be available for a 
misrepresentation under the Fair Trading Act 1986 by undertaking a critical examination 
of New Zealand's leading authority, Cox & Coxon Ltd. Part II describes the conceptual 
distinction between tortious and contractual damages, a distinction fundamental to the 
reasoning of the majority. With particular reference to Australian legislation and authority, 
1 Cox & Coxon LJd v Leipst [1999] 2 NZLR 15; (1998) 8 TCLR 516 [Cox & Coxon LJd]. 
2 Crump v Wala [1994] 2 NZLR 331, 343; 4 NZBLC 103,383; (1994) 6 TCLR 40 [Crump v Wala] . In 
Crump v Wala, the seller made misrepresentations as to the quality of the jeans which the plaintiff 
sub~equently purchased. The High Court awarded the expected profit on the sale of the jeans after a 
breach of s9 of the Fair Trading Act. In a curious result, Hammond J expressed agreement with the view 
in Gates, although proceeded to award expectation damages and denied the plaintiff reliance damages. 
3 Cox & Coxon LJd v Leipst noted in (1999) 8 BCB 113. 
4 See Marks v G/0 Australia Holdings Ud (1998) 158 ALR 333; 73 ALJR 12; Gates v The City Mutual 
life Assurance Society LJd (1986) 160 CLR l ; 63 ALR 600; ATPR 40-666; Kizbeau Pty Ud v WG & B 
Pty LJd (1995) 184 CLR 281; 131 ALR 363; Wardley Australia LJd v State of Western Australia (1992) 
175 CLR 514; 109 ALR 247 and Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 120 ALR 16. 
5 Crump v Wala, above n2, 343. Hammond J also believed that the warning of Lord Simmonds LC in 
Chapman v Chapman [1954] AC 429, 444, that "it is even possible that we are not wiser than our 
ancestors" had to be borne in mind. 
6 Or 3:3 if Thomas J's extra-judicial preferrence for the minority is considered .. See E W Thomas "An 
Endorsement of a More Flexible Law of Civil Remedies" in New Zealand Law Conference Civil Remedies 
Papers, April 1999, 9n. 
7 A Beck "Fair Trading Act Remedies" (1999) NZLJ 97 [Beck]. 
8 Beck, above n7, 99. 
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Part II will also describe the legislative background of section 43(2)(d) of the Fair Trading 
Act, prior to, and following the decision in Cox & Coxon Ltd. Part III will describe and 
critically assess the decision made, expressing a clear preference for the view of the 
majority. Part IV introduces a law and economics approach to misrepresentation and 
applies this to the facts of Cox & Coxon Ltd, concluding that under this approach the view 
of the majority is to be preferred. And finally, Part V concludes with the implications from 
the decision. 
II THE FRAMEWORK 
A The Issue 
The issue decided in Cox & Coxon Ltd was whether, under the Fair Trading Act, the 
remedy available to the purchasers could include recovery of future profits, or expectation 
losses, from misrepresentation. As mentioned, the decision held by a majority of 3:2 that 
expectation losses were not, restricting the measure of damages under section 43(2)(d) of 
the Fair Trading Act to the tortious amount. Although the Fair Trading Act does not 
import any limitations except for those expressed or inherent in the statutory provisions 
themselves, the conceptual difference between the tortious and contractual measures of 
damages is fundamental to the decision of the majority. 
1 The distinction between contractual and tortious measures of damages. 
The general rule of damages is that the plaintiff is entitled to be put into the same position, 
as far as money can do it, as he would have been in had the wrong not been committed. 9 
This formulation is wide enough to include both the tortious and contractual measures of 
damages, however, the difference is explained clearly in Gates v The City Mutual Life 
9 H McGregor McGregor on Damages (16 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997), para 810. See Lord 
Blackburn's widely accepted statement in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App.Cas. 25, 39; See 
also Victoria Laundry (Windsor) l.Jd v Newman Industries l.Jd [1949] 2 KB 528, 539 per Asquith LJ and 
Rainbow Industrial Caterers l.Jd v C.N.R. Co. (1991) 84 D.L.R. 291, 297 per Sopinka J. 
3 
Assurance Society Ltd"0 by the joint judgement of Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ using 
Lon F~ller's classic distinctions; 11 
In contract, damages are awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff in the 
position in which he would have been had the contract been performed - he is 
entitled to damages for loss of bargain (expectation loss) and damage suffered, 
including expenditure incurred, in reliance on the contract (reliance loss). In tort, 
on the other hand, damages are awarded with the object of placing the plaintiff in 
the position he would have been had the tort not been committed (similiar to 
reliance loss) . 
This distinction is explained further in Marks v G/0 Holdings Limited12 by Gauldron J 
who remarked that expectation damages are not to be considered as payable simply for 
thwarted expectations but that damages are payable for the loss involved in non-
performance of the contract or, in other words, the loss of a contractual promise. 
Therefore in contract, damages for loss of bargain and consequential Joss, or loss incurred 
in reliance on the contract, are recoverable. 
In tort, however, the loss represents a failure to leave one alone and the object of tortious 
damages is to place the plaintiff in the position had the tort not been committed, or as if 
the misrepresentation had not been made. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to out of 
10 Gates v The City Mutual Li.fe Assurance Society Ltd (1986) 160 CLR I ; 60 ALJR 239 ; 63 ALR 600; 
ATPR 40-666 {Gates] . In this case the applicant had been misled about the extent of disability cover 
under an insurance policy. Once liability was found , the Australian High Court had to determine the 
appropriate measure of damages for cases involving misleading or deceptive conduct under s82(1) of the 
Trade Practices Act. The Court held that the question to be asked is "how much worse off the plaintiff is 
as a result of entering into the transaction which the representation induced him to enter than he would 
have been had the transaction not taken place" (at p12) . Therefore, the Court allowed recovery of reliance 
loss, not expectation loss. 
11 Gates, above n 10, 11-12. See Fuller and Perdue "The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages" (1936) 46 
Yale LJ 52. Lon Fuller's famous conceptual categorisation of expectancy, reliance, and restitution 
interests were accepted in New Zealand by Newmans Tours Ud v Ranier Investments Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 
68 and Thompson v Rankin [1993) 1 NZLR 408 . 
12 Marks v G/0 Holdings limited (1998) 158 ALR 333; 73 ALJR 12 {Marks} . In this case the borrowers 
believed the loan agreement had a fixed interest rate, however in reality the agreement entitled the lenders 
to vary the rate. The High Court of Australia (Kirby J dissenting) declined to award relief under s87 of the 
Trade Practices Act for the misrepresentation on the basis that t11e applicants had only suffered an 
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pocket loss, or loss which is an immediate result of the misrepresentation, and 
consequential loss, or loss which occurs as a result of reliance on the misrepresentation. 
This reliance loss includes not only trading losses of a business acquired under the contract 
but extends to lost opportunities13 as explained by the joint judgement in Gates; 14 
Because the object of damages in tort is to place the plaintiff in the position in 
which he would have been but for the commission of the tort, it is necessary to 
determine what the plaintiff would have done had he not relied on the 
misrepresentation. If that reliance has deprived him of the opportunity of entering 
into a different contract ... on which he would have made a profit then he may 
recover that profit on the footing that it is part of the loss which he has suffered in 
consequence of altering his position under the inducement of the 
misrepresentation ... . The lost benefit is referable to opportunities forgone by 
reason of reliance on the misrepresentation . 
In Cox & Coxon Ltd Henry and Blanchard JJ held that other consequential losses which 
might be compensable in appropriate circumstances could include loss of opportunity to 
obtain an alternative asset, loss of opportunity to obtain the asset in question at a lesser 
price, wasted expenditure, and trading losses.15 This was illustrated by the Australian 
authority Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL1 6 where the court assessed the damages on the 
basis that the respondents loss was the loss of the benefits from the agreement it would 
have entered into with a third party, were it not for the misrepresentation. 
expectation loss. The High Court affirmed the decision in Gates and held that no loss had been suffered as 
the interest rate under the agreement was lower than the market rate. 
13 L Trotman Misrepresentation and the Fair Trading Act (The Dunmore Press, Palmerston North, 1988) 
53 . 
14 Gates, above n10, 13. 
15 Cox & Coxon l.J.d, above n 1, 28. 
16 Sellars v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1994) 120 ALR 16; 179 CLR 332. The reasoning in Gates and 
Sellars was applied in lospin Pty l.J.d v Copulas Venture Capital Pty l.J.d (1994) ATPR 41-295 . See also 
Takara Properties l.J.d v Rowling [1986] I NZLR 22; Craig v East Coast Bays CC [1986] 1 NZLR 99; 
Esso Petroleum Co l.J.d v Mardon [1976] QB 801 , 820-821 ; Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) l.J.d [1969] 2 QB 
158, 167. 
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In this context, the "artificial distinction" 17 between tort and contract remedies seems 
blurred, 18 with Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ commenting that "in this respect the 
measure of damages in tort begins to resemble the expectation element in the measure of 
damages in contract".19 Gauldron Jin Marks added;20 
That if an applicant can establish that, but for the misleading or deceptive conduct, 
he or she would have entered into a contract that would have returned the very 
benefit that was represented, damages will be the same as if the representation had 
been contractual. 
Gauldron J concluded that "it is possible ... [that] the loss will be the same in money terms 
as it would have been if the representation had been contractual".2 1 And lastly, Gates22 
confirmed that the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that he could and would have 
entered into another contract, and that the plaintiff must prove that loss was in fact 
suffered. 
B The Fair Trading Act 
Critics have described its effect as "cancerous"23 and that the statute floats "like oil across 
water",24 but the Fair Trading Act, introduced in 1986, has an important economic and 
social role in New Zealands legislative landscape. The purpose of the Act is primarily 
consumer protection25 with the intention "to prohibit certain conduct and practices in 
17 D W McLauchlan "Assessment of Damages for Misrepresentations Inducing Contracts" (1987) 6 Otago 
LR 370. 
18 In Elna Australia Pty Lid v International Computers Australia Pty Lid (1987) ATPR 40-795, 48,678, 
Gummow J commented, in a case of misleading or deceptive conduct, that "tort and contract today are 
separated by less than clear bright lines". 
19 Gates, above nlO, 13. 
20 Marks, above n 12, para 19. 
21 Marks, above n12, para 20. 
21 Gates, above nlO, 13. 
13 Crump v Wala, above n2, 343. 
24 Crump v Wala, above n 2, 341. Hammond J continued to mention that "the water .. . is turning out to be 
practically the whole spectrum of commercial law". 
25 The Court of Appeal in Trustbank Auckland Lid v ASB Bank Lid (1989) 2 NZBLC 103,558, 103,563; 
[1989] 3 NZBLR 385,390, stated that "consumer protection is a main object of the Act". 
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trade, to provide for the disclosure of consumer information in relation to the supply of 
goods and services, and to promote product safety".26 
Initiated by the Fourth Labour Government to implement its 1984 election policy for 
"consumer law reform",27 the Act was also introduced as a means of facilitating free trade 
between New Zealand and Australia and a significant step towards the harmonisation of 
business law under the CER Agreement.28 Therefore, the Act is modelled closely on Part 
V of the Trade Pratices Act 1974 (Aust) and many of its provisions have been taken 
directly from, or are identical to, Australian legislation. Because of this, the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal commented that as far as reasonably practicable, consistency in the 
application of the Australian and New Zealand Acts should be aimed at. 29 
I Comparison between the Australian and New Zealand legislation 
Section 43 of the Fair Trading Act allows the Court to make a remedial orders if it finds 
that any person has suffered, or is likely to suffer, loss or damage because of anothers 
conduct. Within this "big basket"30 of remedies available lies section 43(2)(d) which allows 
the payment for damage or loss suffered, following a misrepresentation. 
New Zealand had adopted both Australian damages provisions, section 82 and section 87, 
although it was section 43 (sirniliar to section 87) which survived the legislative process 
but its equivalent (sirniliar to section 82) did not. There was little explanation for the 
deletion31 and the divergence from the Australian sections from which the Act is based. 
26 The Fair Trading Act 1986, the Long Title. 
27 The Fair Trading Act 1986: Explanatory Booklet (Wellington, Department of Trade and Industry) 5; 
[1985) NZPD 7885 (intro); [1986) NZPD 3286 (2r). 
28 Y van Roy Competition Laws (CCH New Zealand Ltd, Auckland, 1991) 351. 
29 Taylor Bras LJd v Taylors Textile Services Auckland LJd [1988) 2 NZLR 1; (1988) 2 TCLR 447; [1988) 
2 NZBLC 103,032. 
30 R Asher "The Vile Intrusion/Magnificent Intervention of the Fair Trading Act into Contracts" 3 NZLJ 
85. 
31 Chairman of the Commerce and Marketing Select Committee, Mr P Neilson, stated in the Report on the 
Bill that "Clause 36 [Australian equivalent s82], which related to damages, has been deleted in favour of 
including damages as one of the list of possible orders available to the courts and small claims tribunals 
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The best justification for the deletion of the Australian section 82 would appear to be the 
removal of an undoubted overlap that existed between sections 82 and 87.32 Following a 
consequent amendment, the resulting section is an amalgam of both these Australian 
sections, neither of which compel any measure of damage or any limitations in its 
application.33 This was reaffirmed by the decision in Marks, that the measure of damages 
under the Trade Practices Act is not confined by analogy to common law principles.34 
2 Specific differences: 
(a) New Zealand section 43(2)(d) and Australian section 82(1) 
In Cox & Coxon Ltd, Gault J stated that the New Zealand prov1s1on had the inherent 
limitation that "its terms [do] not extend to an order to pay the amount of loss or damage 
likely to be suffered in the future". 35 His Honour continued to mention the statutory 
scheme of the Fair Trading Act where other provisions seemed "more apt to address likely 
future loss". Tipping J disagreed, believing that section 43(2)(d) "must include loss or 
damage likely to be suffered by the plaintiff', 36 and that the discretion should be flexible, 
both as to measure and amount, after citing Goldsbro v Walker. 37 
under clause 38". This is a very unhelpful statement and none of the 58 submissions presented to the 
select committee offered any assistance. 
32 Tronnan, above n13, 11. See also D W McLauchlan "Review of L Tronnan, Misrepresentation and the 
Fair Trading Act" (1989) 19 VUWLR 93, where McLauchlan suggests it was an unintentional mistake by 
the Department officials in a misguided attempt to simplify the Bill. 
33 Frith v Gold Coast Mineral Springs Pty l.Jd (1983) 65 FLR 213, 232. 
34 For a New Zealand authority, Thorp J noted in Quick Snax l.1d v Uncles Group (NZ) Lid (19 June 
1998, Thorp J, HC Auckland, CP 1137/92), after referring to Goldsbro, that section 43 provided the court 
with a wide range of discretionary powers, "a special package of remedies" which supercede conventional 
common law rules. 
35 Cox & Coxon Lid, above n 1, 22. 
36 Cox & Coxon Lid, above nl, 37. 
31 Goldsbro v Walker [1993] 1 NZLR 394. In Goldsbro, fraudulent misrepresentations were made during 
the acquisition of a property by the purchaser and lawyers involved. Both parties were held liable by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal under s9, while also holding that section 43(2)(d) did not import the 
common law rule where a tortfeaser whose wrongful conduct contributed to cause damage was liable for 
the whole damage to the plaintiff. Therefore in keeping to the spirit and intent of the Act, the Court of 
Appeal held that s43(2)(d) was discretionary as to amount in order to ensure justice between parties of the 
case. 
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The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Goldsbro decided that the power to award payment 
of the full loss of damage encompassed the power to order part of the amount, and thus 
illustrated the discretionary nature of section 43(2)(d). Therefore in this regard, Goldsbro 
is not authority for the proposition that the court has an untrammelled discretion, both as 
to measure and amount in awarding damages, but that section 43(2)(d) is discretionary in 
nature. 
In Goldsbro, Cooke P commented on section 82( 1) of the Australian provisions;38 
A monetary award is but one of an extensive list of alternative or cumulative 
remedies the court "may" grant under the New Zealand Act. In this respect the New 
Zealand Act differs from [section] 82(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, which takes the form that a person suffering loss or 
damage "may recover" the amount: words which seem to confer a right of action. 
Our [section] 43 is of a different structure and I think that the difference is 
significant. As to a monetary award, no right of action is conferred. It is one of a 
range of discretionary remedies. 
Hence, Cooke P is articulating the difference between a statutory and discretionary 
remedy, as in section 43 (also section 87 of the Australian Act), and a merely statutory 
remedy which confers a "right to recover the loss or damage",39 (section 82(1) of the 
Australian Act). 
However, section 43 is confined by its terms to damage "suffered" and section 82 suggests 
a statutory cause of action for a specific amount, rather than a discretionary remedy for a 
discretionary amount. In this regard, sections 82 and 43 are identical addressing the actual 
loss or damage incurred, as distinct from potential or likely damage. 40 Because of these 
38 Goldsbro v Walker, above n37, 399. 
39 State of Western Australia v Wardley Australia Ltd (1991) 30 FCR 245, 259 per Spender, Gummow, 
and Lee JJ . 
40 Wardley Australia Ltd v State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514; 109 ALR 247, 254 per Mason 
CJ who referenced Swingcastle Ltd v Gibson [1990] 1 WLR 1223, 1236 per Sir John Megaw; see also 
[1991] 2 AC 223, 232, per Lord Lowry, referring to the words of Sir John Megaw on the appeal to the 
House of Lords. 
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similiarities, section 82 authority has been applied in New Zealand because of the absence 
of material differences between these sections. 41 
(b) New Zealand section 43(2)(d) and Australian sections 82(1), 87 
Section 87(2)(d) of the Australian Act has very similiar wording to section 43(2)(d), and it 
is generally accepted that both are discretionary in nature. Section 87 refers to "likely loss 
or damage", a suggestion of a wider ambit of compensation than section 82 in order to 
prevent or reduce the loss or damage. This is the interpretation favoured by Tipping J after 
reliance on the Australian authorities Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky, 42 Akron Securities 
v Illiffe43 and Collings Construction Co Pty Ltd v The Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission. 44 These authorities preferred the broader interpretation of relief 
under section 87 and therefore included expectation damages. Tipping J concluded that 
there were no material differences between sections 87 and 43,45 in order to establish 
comparability with this Australian case law. If this were established, as Tipping J attempts 
to do, the availability of expectation damages would seem to follow as a natural 
consequence. However, this contradicts the weight of case law and opinion where it has 
been held that section 43 is restricted to damage or loss suffered. Therefore, the relevance 
of section 87 jurisprudence relating to the equivalent New Zealand measure of damages 
under this rationale is highly questionable, if not irrelevant. 
A recent topic of debate is the legislative intention of section 87, Tipping J of the opinion 
that the scheme of the Act suggests different purpose to that of section 82. However in 
TPC v Queensland Aggregates Pty Ltcf6 Franki J suggested that the measure of damages 
under section 82 and the amount which may be awarded under section 87(2)(d) does not 
41 Trotman, above nl3, 12. 
42 (1992) 110 FLR 608 . 
43 (1997) 143 ALR 457. 
44 (1998) 43 NSWLR 131; [1998) NSWSC 32. 
45 Cox & Coxon LLd, above nl, 37. 
46 (1981) 6 TPC 689, 874. 
10 
differ. 47 Tipping J attempted to distinguish Gates, as the decision was concerned only with 
section 82(1), however statements made were not limited to this rigid approach. The 
majority, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ state;48 
The [Trade Practices] Act does not prescribe the measure of damages recoverable 
by a plaintiff for contravention of the provisions of Pts IV and V. Accordingly, it is 
for the courts to determine what is the appropriate measure of damages recoverable 
by a plaintiff who suffers loss or damage by conduct done in contravention of the 
relevant provisions. 
In Marks, Gauldron J remarked that the established measures of damages "signify different 
kinds of loss and not different methods by which loss is measured",49 and that once this is 
understood; 
It is irrelevant to inquire as to the appropriate measure of damages for the purposes 
of sections 82 and 87 of the Act. Rather, the task is simply to identify the loss or 
damage suffered or likely to be suffered and, then, to make orders for recovery of 
that amount under section 82 or to compensate for or prevent or reduce ihat loss or 
damage under section 87 of the Act. 
The view of McHugh, Hayne and Callinan JJ accord with those of Gauldron J by holding 
that: 50 
The central inquiry is what consequence bas the contravention of the Act had on 
the party in question. That requires comparison between the position in fact of the 
party which alleges loss and the position that would have been obtained had there 
been no contravention . 
47 This corresponds to the opinion of B G Donald and J D Heydon Tra,ie Practices Law (Volumes I and 
2, The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1978) 853, where it is stated that there is no "relevant distinction" 
between the two Australian provisions save for the limitation period and "the same considerations 
apparently arise as to the amount of damages recoverable" under both sections. 
48 Gates, above nlO, 11. 
49 Marks, above nl2, para 15. 
50 Marks, above n12, para 53. 
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The majority continue to add that "actual loss need not be suffered before an order is 
made"51 under section 87 which is in harmony with the wording of section 87, "likely loss 
or damage". This opinion is consistent with the leading Australian case, Gates, and the 
recent New Zealand authority Cox & Coxon Ltd, who were in agreement that expectation 
losses were not recoverable for misrepresentations, and that "the measure of damages in 
tort is appropriate in most, if not all, .. . cases". 52 They also commented that they would 
not be restrained by the historical amount recoverable under an action in deceit or other 
common law analogies, and thus believed, concurring with Marks, that "no narrow 
construction of the Act should be adopted".53 However, Marks warned that "the words of 
the Act should not be stretched beyond their limit",54 in order to award damages for 
conceptually different contravention, like the opinion of Tipping J. 
Therefore, there is considerable judicial opinion to establish that expectation losses are not 
recoverable under sections 82(1) and 87 of the Australian Act, or section 43(2)(d) of the 
New Zealand Act. If that were not to be held to be so, the applicability and comparability 
of Australian section 87 to New Zealand's section 43(2)(d) should be distinguished due to 
the difference in terms and legislative purpose. The underlying conceptual basis for the 
awarding of damages under section 87 would therefore be inconsistent with the narrower 
New Zealand interpretation for misrepresentations and should not be adopted or used as 
relevant authority. 
Ill COX & COXON LTD v LE/PST 
A The Facts 
In 1995 the real estate agents, Cox & Coxon Ltd, misrepresented to the purchasers, 
Leipst, that the property had yielded 58 bins of pears which were sold to Watties for 
$12,000. The statement was subsequently included as an appendix to the agreement. In 
51 Marks, above n 12, para 45. 
52 Gates, above nlO, 14. 
53 Marks, above n12, para 56. 
54 Marks, above n12, para 56. 
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fact, the pears were sold for $8,801.16. The action was successful against the vendor 
under the Contractual Remedies Act, and now sought to claim under the Fair Trading Act 
against the agent. In an agreement between the parties, if liability were established, the 
quantum of the loss was $16,000. The damages were calculated as the loss of income 
suffered over a period of twenty years, and therefore, represented an expectation loss. 
The District Court held that the representation was essentially one as to the volume of 
production, not the price, and that the inclusion of the figure had not caused any loss to 
the plaintiffs. The High Court disagreed, awarding the agreed damages of $16,000. 
Therefore, the issue confronting the Court of Appeal, is whether expectation losses should 
be available under the Fair Trading Act 1986. 
B The Majority - Henry and Blanchard JJ, and Gault J 
The majority delivered two judgements, by Henry and Blanchard JJ (written by Henry J), 
and Gault J, deciding that expectation losses were not recoverable under the Fair Trading 
.. Act 1986 for losses incurred through misleading conduct inducing entry into contract. The 
following analysis will outline the reasons and merits of their decision and will attempt to 
assess the judicial quality of this decision. 
1 The Conceptual Argument 
In order to give a remedy, they argued a promise must be more than merely promissory, 
but it must be enforceable at law. Conceptually, the loss of bargain or of expected future 
return flows not from the conduct that is wrongful, but from the failure to implement a 
promise. Since no contract existed between the agent (Cox & Coxon Ltd) and the 
purchasers (Leipst), there was no promise which failure to implement derived the other 
party of expected benefits. Their Honours said:55 
55 Cox & Coxon LJd, above n 1, 26. 
13 
The only duty which can give rise to a claim for lost benefit or loss of expectation is 
one which imposes an obligation to perform the representation .... [therefore] the 
promise must be enforceable at law if it is to give rise to a remedy .. .. To hold that 
misrepresentation inducing a contract can give rise to a claim for expectation losses 
under [section] 43(2)(d) is to turn on its head the whole rationale of the damages 
for a civil wrong. 
This rationale is the conceptual difference between the tortious and contractual measures 
of damages. In the common law, as under the English Misrepresentation Act 1967, the 
tort measure of damages applies for an action in deceit. As McGregor comments, it would 
seem;56 
Highly improbable that all this learning should be overthrown .. . by allowing the 
generally more generous contractual measure of damages to rule where the new 
statutory liability was involved. And, more importantly, it would be very odd that 
this contractual measure should be available to a plaintiff complaining of an 
innocent, though admittedly negligent, misrepresentation when it was clear that for 
a fraudulent misrepresentation he was undoubtedly limited to the tortious measure. 
However, it was accepted by all judges in Cox & Coxon Ltd that the remedy under the 
Fair Trading Act is both statutory and discretionary, and that nothing in the language of 
the Act imported notions of contract or tort in assessing damages. Nevertheless, Henry 
and Blanchard JJ believed that "the rationale behind the two concepts may well be relevant 
when considering a particular set of circumstances". 57 This view is consistent with the 
majority in Gates where it was said;58 
The courts are not bound to make a definitive choice between the two measures of 
damages so that one applies to all contraventions to the exclusion of the other. 
However, there is much to be said for the view that the measure of damage in tort is 
appropriate in most, if not all, Pt V cases, especially those involving misleading or 
deceptive conduct and the making of false statements. Such conduct is similiar both 
56 McGregor, above n9, para 1998. 
51 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 25. 
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in character and effect to tortious conduct, particularly fraudulent misrepresentation 
and negligent misstatement. 
Gault J believed the task was to identify the loss caused by the misleading or deceptive 
conduct which is similiar to the majority in Marks, who emphasised the focus should be on 
the damage or loss that has been caused as a result of the conduct contravening the Act. 
Therefore, the emphasis lies on the loss or damage from the contravention, not the 
measure of damages, and despite the fundamental rationale remaining relevant, the 
question that should be asked is, what position would the plaintiff have enjoyed had there 
been no misrepresentation? 
The majority held there was no justifiable basis for construing section 43 in such a way as 
to give the representee a right to enforce a representation which is misleading. Absent 
such a right, entitlement to damages for non-performance of the representation, or loss of 
benefit, cannot lie. This, they believed, is the inherent logical fallacy in the argument for 
expectation damages, for, as the majority explains, "had there been no misrepresentation, 
that is no breach of duty, there is no logical basis for asserting the purchasers here would 
have obtained the benefit now claimed". 59 Hence, the fundamental rationale underlying the 
tort measure of damages still applies to the Fair Trading Act, despite the source of relief 
shifting from common law to statute. 
2 The Statutory Scheme I Shift in Legal Responsibility 
The majority argued that section 9 created a duty not to mislead and that failing to make 
good a misleading statement did not constitute a breach of the Act. Section 9, they 
continued, did not create a duty to perform obligations which amount to contractual 
promises, but it was section 6 of the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 in New Zealand that 
had this effect. "Section 43(2)(d) does not purport to make a representation enforceable 
58 Gates, above n 10, 14. 
59 Cox & Coxon l.Jd, above nl, 26. 
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against a representor. It says there is liability for loss or damage resulting from the 
representation. The difference is real and substantive."60 
They argued that the adoption of Tipping J's view, that expectation damages should be 
available, would be to make the representation a term of the contract, which they added, is 
something expressly achieved by the 1979 Act. If it were to do the same as the 
Contractual Remedies Act it would make an agent acting in the course of trade potentially 
liable for performance of the principal's contract as though a contracting party, or 
effectively, the agent becomes the promisor. 
Henry and Blanchard JJ descride this outcome as "far-reaching ... [resulting] in a dramatic 
shift in legal responsibility". 61 Gault J gives the example of the previous operator of the 
orchard if, when giving information to the real estate agent, he had known it would be 
passed on to prospective purchasers would have been liable for the purchasers loss of 
future profits. He asks the question, which the majority reply in the negative, "is that 
broad construction to be given in furtherance of the consumer protection objectives 
generally ascribed to the Act?62 It is axiomatic that the intention of the Act was of 
consumer protection, not the enforcement of pre-contractual promises. Any contrary 
interpretation, they stated, required "an implication which does not sit comfortably with 
the words of the statute". 63 
Tipping J, however, believed that it was "both conceptually reasonable and in accordance 
with the policy of the Act",64 to allow the court to require the non-contracting agent to 
pay a sum of money to honour the promise inherent in the representation. He maintained 
that the majorities view was based on the historical limitation of privity of contract, and 
that it was inherent in section 43 that the vendor and the agent could be liable for the same 
loss. This, he continued, was an inconsistency and that the distinction drawn between 
6° Cox & Coxon lid, above nl, 26. 
61 Cox & Coxon lid, above nl, 28. 
62 Cox & Coxon lid, above n 1, 19. 
63 Cox & Coxon lid, above nl, 28. 
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contractual and tortious damages created an anomalous result, because the agent and 
vendor would be liable for different amounts, despite the same loss being incurred. He 
continued to justify his position by adding;65 
If the vendor is insolvent, the risk of that insolvency should fall on the agent rather 
than on the purchasers. It is the agent who is responsible for the misleading 
conduct, not the purchasers, who would otherwise suffer on account of the failure of 
the vendor. The agent can always tailor what is said so as to exclude personal 
liability by making it clear that the agent is not vouching for the accuracy of the 
information conveyed. 
While this view has some moral justification, it neglects the importance of a contractual 
\ 
right and that the islead urchasers could recover against an agent an amount similiar, if 
not the same, as t e contractual measure existing in the current law. The adoption of 
Tipping J' s opinion will extend separate liability to any person who is "in any way directly 
or indirectly knowingly concerned in, or party to, the contravention"66 as a guarantor of 
the contracting party's obligation. This would undermine contractual and commercial 
certainty and would stretch the words of the Act beyond their limit, and thus, would not 
adher to the warning given by Marks , or the view expressed by the Cox & Coxon Ltd 
majority. 
The minority view is essentially based on a general statement of principle; that an agent 
ought to be held accountable for representations which are misleading or deceptive. 67 
Accepted as a principle of law by the majority, they hold that where loss has occured the 
the tortious measure is sufficient to compensate for a non-contracting party, and where no 
loss occurs, other sanctions are available in the scope of the Act. The policy of the Act, 
contrary to what Tipping J may advocate, is to provide consumer protection and does not 
64 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 38. 
65 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl , 40. 
66 The Fair Trading Act 1986, s 43(1)(d) . 
67 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 30. 
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extend to include the enforcement of contractual prom1sor the performance of non-
contracting party's representations. 
Conceptually, it is consistent and reasonable to allow loss of bargain or expectation losses 
in the case of promises made by contracting party's, but it is unreasonable to hold a non-
contracting party liable for contractual expectations, legitimately formed by anothers 
conduct. For as mentioned, the loss of bargain or of expected future returns flows not 
from the conduct that is wrongful, but from the failure to implement a promise. 
C The Minority - Richardson P and Tipping J 
The minority judgement was delivered by Tipping J, with Richardson P merely concurring. 
Tipping J took the view that pre-contractual representations contained "promissory 
connotations"68 and "it may be perfectly reasonable to take the view that the representor is 
at least implicitly promising the representee that the facts stated are true and the 
representee may act accordingly".69 He continued to add that;70 
If there is a promise directly or indirectly inherent in the misrepresentation, it is a 
relatively short step to require the person who made the representation to 
compensate the other party for the failure of the facts to fulfil the promise. It can 
fairly be said that the representee's expectations, having been legitimately formed 
as a result of the representation and not fulfilled, must now be made good by a sum 
of money. 
Tipping J maintained that an unduly rigid approach was unnecessary71 and found two 
measures of appropriate measure of loss. 72 The first is a similiar restatement of the tortious 
measure, the "notional resale", which measures the difference between the price paid and a 
price notionally obtainable, including the incidental expenses of the sale. The second 
68 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 30. 
69 Cox & Coxon LJd, above n 1, 41 . 
1° Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 30. 
71 Tipping J cited New Zealand Land Development Co LJd v Porter [1992) 2 NZLR 362 as authority for 
this proposition. 
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approach was to establish the present value of the future losses based upon what the 
position would have been had the misrepresentation been accurate. This measure imports 
the prospect ofrecovering expectation losses as opposed to reliance losses.73 The measure 
applied would depend on the substitutability of a purchase, for if it were reasonable to sell, 
the notional resale method would be more appropriate, and if it were reasonable to retain, 
the "future present value" method would apply. Therefore, under this flexible approach, 
the court would need to determine which measure would be more appropriate in a given 
situation, allowing the court to avoid injustices to consumers who have been the victims of 
. 1 d. d 74 m1s ea mg con uct. 
This approach has distanced itself from common law analogies, where the majority has, 
under Tipping J' s rationale, wrongly constrained themselves by reliance on former law 
which the Fair Trading Act was designed to ameliorate. As Keene75 argues, if the starting 
point for the analysis is the .basic rationale for expectation damages, like the majority, then 
a result which did not allow expectation losses would follow as a natural consequence. If, 
however, the decision was not tainted by by previous conceptual frameworks, such as 
Tipping J's, the ensuing outcome can be more easily understood. The argument would 
then become one of statutory purpose; whether the Act was designed to signal a 
completely new direction or whether the Act is to be viewed as part of, or contributing to, 
the overall body of knowledge. Tipping J' s approach, as Beck argues,76 is more consistent 
with the consumer protection objective in the Act, which is supported by Keene, who 
believed that the majority negated the wider purposes of the remedial legislation. 
However, this 'substitutability' approach would result in fmancial inconsistencies in the 
application of the consumer protection objectives, clearly inconsistent with the policy of 
72 Cox & Coxon l.1d, above nl, 29-31 per Tipping J. 
73 B Keene "Fair Trading Act Damage: A Statutory Test" [1999] 4 NZLJ 107. 
74 Beck, above n7, 99. 
75 Keene, above n73, 108. 
76 A Beck "Contract" (1991) 1 NZ Law Rev 51 , 54. 
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the Act.77 It would also be for the court to decide what is, and what is not substitutable, 
surely more appropriately decided by the plaintiffs. 
In Goldsbro, both Cooke P and Richardson J emphasize that the governing principle is to 
impose a remedy which "gives effect to the policy of the Act"78 and that it is ultimately 
justice that must be done in the circumstances of the particular case.79 In Cox & Coxon Ltd 
the majority prefer to limit the general words of Go/dsbro to a discretion as to amount and 
not a discretion as to measure, and therefore insisting on giving proper effect to the words 
of the statute. Tipping J, however, relied on Goldsbro as authority to assert that there 
should be a discretion both as to measure and amount, much like Thomas J, in Smythe v 
Bayleys Real Estate Ltd, 80 who wrongly cited Goldsbro as authority for not adhering to 
the tort measure and thus awarding rental income for the remaining term of the lease. 
Henry and Blanchard JJ, however, maintain that Smythe is only correct if considered as a 
loss of opportunity case, and if viewed as a expectation loss case, they would not follow 
it. 
It can be asserted that Tipping J' s opinion has been founded on an incorrect interpretation 
of the decision in Goldsbro and is a result of a conceptual misunderstanding of the tortious 
measure of damages . Tipping J cited Gates and held, after wrongly interpreting Gibbs CJ 
judgement, that it was "the difference in value ... as represented and as written".81 This is 
clearly untrue, for it is the value between price paid and the actual value which amounts 
to, in Tipping J' s words, "the classic tort measure". 82 Tipping J added that the inclusion of 
foreseeable consequential loss was an extension of the ordinary tort measure, which again 
77 For example, if the subject maller is nol readily substilut.able the contractual measure applies, whereas if 
the subject maller is readily substitutable the tortious measure applies. 
18 Goldsbro v Walker, above n37, 399. 
79 Asher, above n30, 87 . 
80 (1993) 5 TCLR 544. Thomas Jin the High Court held the defendants, including the agent, liable under 
s9 for false representations regarding an investment. by the plaintiff. Thomas J awarded lost income in 
order to give effect to the policy of the Act and achieve justice between the parties. See also Quick Snax 
lJd v Uncles Group (NZ) lJd (19 June 1998, Thorp J, HC Auckland, CP 1137/92); Gloken Holdings lJd v 
The CDE Company l..Jd (1997) 6 NZBLC 102,272. 
81 Cox & Coxon l.Jd, abov~ nl, 33. 
82 Cox & Coxon 11d, above nl , 33. 
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is plainly incorrect, as foreseeable consequential loss including loss of opportunity, are 
ordinarily a part of the tort measure. 
This, and the citing of Sellars as authority, illustrates Tipping J' s misunderstanding or 
disregard for the fundamental underlying rationale of tortious damages. For, as he 
continues, "such loss (in reality being deprived of a future benefit) is essentially an 
expectation loss."83 This misinterpretation of the tortious measure would not allow 
Tipping J to appreciate the words of the majority, that expectation damages flow not from 
wrongful conduct but the failure to implement a promise. The lost opportunity the plaintiff 
claims is due to the failure to leave them alone and constitutes part of the tortious 
measure, and is not, "essentially an expectation loss". 
Tipping J, whether intentionally or not, has misinterpreted the tortious measure of 
damages to show the blurred distinction between the two measures of damages. Once · 
established, Tipping J could argue that the arbitrary distinctions should no longer apply in 
favour of an overall discretion, in order "to tailor the remedy to the particular facts so as 
to do justice in the individual case."84 Conversely, however, this strengthens the majorities 
· viewpoint, that the tortious measure of damages provide flexibility. in order to compensate 
in similiar, if not the same, money terms whilst remaining conceptually consistent. Under 
this interpretation, the decision in Cox & Coxon Ltd provides a rational solution to the 
issue in debate. 
D The Issue of Loss or Damage 
Another issue to be determined was whether loss or damage had been proven to satisfy the 
requirements of section 43(2)(d). Because the majority concluded that expectation losses 
were not available and that the only loss claimed was that of expectation loss, the logical 
conclusion was that no loss or damage had in fact occured. Tipping J, on the other hand, 
held that the diminished profitability was attributable to the misrepresentation, and using 
83 Cox & Coxon LJd, above nl, 34. 
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his formulation concluded it was reasonable not to sell, and therefore calculated the 
damages by the present value of future losses. There are two difficulties with this 
reasoning. Firstly, the statement was as to a past fact and it would be wrong to assume 
any future profitability from this information. Tipping J, in effect, predicts future revenue 
by awarding future profit to the purchasers. Secondly, this result originates from an 
incorrect premise: that because the misrepresentation induced the purchase, the purchasers 
paid more than they would otherwise have paid for the property. 85 This is not correct. 
Because a misrepresentation is present it is wrong to infer that the purchasers had paid 
more for the property than they otherwise would. In Marks the majority stated;86 
The bare fact that a contract has been made which confers rights and or imposes 
obligations that are different from what one party represented to be the case does 
not demonstrate that the party that was misled has suffered loss or damage. 
The point is illustrated by the majority in Marks, for;87 
If a person agrees to pay $50,000 for goods which the vendor falsely represents are 
worth $100,000 but which are, in fact, worth $50,000, what loss· has the purchaser 
who is misled suffered by agreeing to buy (assuming no more is known)? 
The only loss would be a lost opportunity, or the alternative uses for the money bound by 
the misrepresentation, which is recoverable under the tortious measure of damages. Beck 
argues that this is a "harsh result"88 as the court has moved away from the "conventional 
understanding of the law."89 Alternatively, it would be 'harsh' to compel an agent to 
compensate where no loss has been caused, a result which is both historically and 
conceptually consistent. 
84 Cox & Coxon ll.d, above n 1, 34. 
85 Beck, above n7, 98-99. 
86 Marks, above nl2, para 47. The contrary view, adopted by the Full Court of the Federal Court in 
Jobbins v Capel Court Corp ll.d (1989) 25 FCR 226 was rejected by the majority in Wardley Australia Ltd 
v State of Western Australia (1992) 175 CLR 514,527 per Mason CJ, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
87 Marks, above nI2, para 50. For more discussion see McLauchlan, above n17, at p 379. 
88 Beck, above n7, 99. 
89 Beck, above n7, 99. 
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IV AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
In order to assess the outcome of Cox & Coxon Ltd a broader policy analysis should be 
applied to the issue of whether expectation damages should be available for a 
misrepresentation under the Fair Trading Act. The following section will outline the 
underlying economic rationale behind contractual and tortious damages and apply these 
concepts to misrepresentation and the facts of Cox & Coxon Ltd. It is important to 
consider whether it will be able to determine if, under economic rationale, the majority, or 
minority, are correct. 
Law and economics co-exist together, for the Fair Trading Act was conceived after the 
economic free-market theory of 'caveat emptor' (let the buyer beware) had failed, and the 
unequal bargaining power of consumers had to be protected. Therefore. because 
economics underpins commercial law it is essential to assess the economic perspective on 
the issue, as a law and economics appr9ach would be extremely relevant. It is also 
important to note that many judges have commented for the need for an economic 
analysis, including Richardson J, who remarked that "the Court should be furnished with 
arguments and available analytical materials so that the proposed policy alternatives are 
considered in an informed way, rather than resting on instinctive responses supported by 
generalised reasons". 90 
A Contractual Damages 
From an economic viewpoint the primary function of contract law is to maintain incentives 
toward, and to facilitate the conclusion of, exchanges that move resources from less to 
more valuable resources91 . Trebilcock92 divides this overriding aim into four main 
90 Williams v Attorney General (1990) 1 NZLR 646, 681. See also South Pacific Manufacturing Co Ltd v 
New 7.ealand Security Consultants & Investigations Ltd [1992] 2 NZLR 282, 305 per Richardson J; Day v 
Mead (1987] 2 NZLR 431, 458 per Somers J; Canadian National Railway Co v Norsk Pacific Steamship 
Co ("Jervis Crown") (1992) 91 DLR (4th) 289,360 per McLachlin J; and Morgan Crucible Co Plc v Hill 
Samuel Bank Ltd [1990] 3 All ER 330, 335 per Hoffman J; overruled [1991] I All ER 148 (CA). 91 E MacKaay Economics of Information and Law (Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, Boston, 1982) 57. 
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purposes. Firstly, contractual damages function to provide an incentive to adher to the 
terms of the contract and facilitate exchange, as exchange would be considerably 
restrained without the possibilty of enforcement. Secondly, the law provides standard sets 
of implied terms93 which save both parties transaction costs94 in the bargaining process. 
Thirdly, contract law discourages carelessness in the exchange process, causing 
detrimental reliance. For example, in rules relating to mistake and promissory estoppel the 
law attempts to assign liability for negative outcomes from an exchange to the party who 
could have avoided the problem by taking cost-justified precautions. Fourthly, contract 
law has formulated a set of excuses for contract performance that permits the enforcement 
of efficient exchanges, but discourages the enforcement of inefficient exchanges that do 
not meet the criterion of Pareto efficiency.95 For example, lack of voluntariness or duress 
and imperfect information such as non-disclosure should not be enforced as both parties 
do not percieve the exchange as mutually beneficial, and is thus not Pareto efficient. 
The law and economics approach distinguishes between a complete contract, where all 
contingencies are planned for and responsibilities defined, and incomplete contracts, where 
the law fills in ·the "gaps" in the contract. A complete contract through cooperative 
bargaining will maximise both parties joint utility or benefit, and is therefore efficient. In 
reality, the complete contract is almost an economic construct as the increased transaction 
costs associated with the drafting and negotiation of a comprehensive contract for every 
concieved contingency is unimaginable. Therefore, the payment of damages for breach of 
contract can be seen to serve as an implicit substitute for contingent terms m an 
incomplete contract and will lead to behaviour sirniliar to that in complete contracts. 
92 M J Trebilcock "Law and Economics" (1993) 16(2) Dalhousie L J, 369. 
93 For example the Sale of Goods Act 1908, the Partnership Act 1908 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 
1993. 
94 Transaction costs are defined as costs incurred in the bargaining process. Transaction costs include the 
costs of identifying the parties with whom one has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the 
costs of the bargaining process itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached. See generally A M 
Polinsky An Introduction to Law and Economics (2nd ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1989). 95 Broadly speaking economics refers to efficiency as the relationship between the aggregate benefits of a 
situation and the aggregate costs of the situation or as the "size of the pie". A sitution is said to be efficient 
when there is a net benefit to society. Pareto effiency is when there is no change from that situation that 
can make someone better off without making someone worse off (after Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto). 
See generally Polinsky, above n94. 
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Contractual damages therefore restrain opportunistic breaches of contract,96 but many 
breaches are involuntary, where performance is impossible at a reasonable cost, or 
voluntary and efficient. As Holmes writes and Posner quotes97; 
It is not the policy of the law to compel adherence to contracts but only to require 
each party to choose between performing in accordance with the contract and 
compensating the other party for any injury resulting from a failure to perform. 
Therefore, in many situations it will be more efficient to breach the contract than to 
perform on its terms. Posner gives the following example.98 Suppose I sign a contract with 
A to deliver 100,000 widgets at $0.10 each. After the signature B explains he needs 
25,000 widgets quickly and is prepared to pay $0.15 each. If I accept B's offer and A, as a 
result of the delay suffers damages worth $1,000, the breach would still be value 
maximising as I will still be able to pay A damages and still have a positive net revenue. In 
Posners view, these breaches should be encouraged on the grounds that it brings resources 
to higher-valued uses than was initially foreseen and thus would improve welfare for 
society as a whole. 99 This would be regarded as an efficient breach of contract. 
The expectation remedy is the only remedy that creates efficient incentives to breach a 
contract. This is because the expectation remedy forces the breaching party to pay in 
damages the value of the good to the breached-against party. This value represents the 
profit the breached-against party would receive from the contract, so is therefore 
indifferent to performance of the contract or the expectation remedy. If another buyer 
values the good more than this, then it is efficient for that buyer to have the good. Given 
the expectation measure of damages, the seller will have an incentive to breach in order to 
obtain the higher offer (see above example) . If another buyer values the good less than the 
96 Referred to by economists as a 'moral hazard' . 
97 RA Posner Economic Analysis of ww (4 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1992) 118, quoted from O L 
Holmes "The Path of the Law" (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 462. 
98 Posner, above n97, 119. This example is also used by Mackaay, above n91, 58. 99 MacKaay, above n91, 58. 
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original buyer, a breach is not efficient and the expectation remedy will appropriately 
discourage breaches. In other words, under the expectation measure a seller compares the 
cost of performance against the value to the buyer in deciding whether to commit a 
breach. If the cost of paying damages is higher than the cost of performing the contract, 
then the contract will be completed, but if the cost of performing the contract is higher 
than the cost of paying damages, then the seller will commit an efficient breach of 
contract. 
However, under the reliance measure of damages sellers would breach contractual 
commitments more regularly as production costs would more often be less then the cost of 
performance. Buyers would also have little incentive to enter contractual commitments as 
the remedy consequent to a breach would only place the buyer in the position they would 
have enjoyed prior to the contract. Similiarly, specific performance would be to the sellers 
and societies detriment forcing the performance of inefficient contracts, and leading to 
excessive performance. 
Therefore, the expectation remedy for breach of contract allows performance of 
incomplete contracts as optimal complete contracts, resulting in the greatest expected net 
value or efficiency. This suggets that both the buyer and seller would agree, prior to 
performance, to employ the expectation measure rather than any other remedy for breach. 
B Tortious Damages 
Oversimplified, the law and economics approach to tortious liability is the least-cost 
avioder test. 10° From a law and economics perspective the purpose of tortious liability is 
social efficiency and not merely compensation, for if it were so, then concepts such as 
negligence and fault would not be part of the law. Hence, the purpose of the law of torts is 
to deter uneconomical accidents, or in other words, to avoid those torts that could have 
100 See M J Trebilcock "The Future of Tort Law: Mapping the Contours of the Debate" (1989) 15 CBLJ 
471, for a more comprehensive discussion . 
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been avoided at a cost lower than that of the accident. 101 In United States v Carroll 
Towing1°2 Judge Learned Hand expressed this concept in his negligence standard: 
The defendant is guilty of negligence if the loss caused by the accident, multiplied 
by the probability of the accident's occuring, exceeds the burden of the precautions 
that the defendant might have taken lo avert it. 
Therefore, the rule is not intended to discourage all accidents, only to discourage the 
infliction of losses if its avoidance would be less costly. Cost minimisation and efficiency 
will occur if potential accident creators take those precautions that reduce expected 
accident losses by more than the cost of the precautions. 103 It is important to note that the 
Hand formula is too narrow, for the general rule also includes precautions taken by the 
victim or offender to reduce ·accident costs by more than their cost. 104 
·For example, on the facts of United States v Carroll Towing Judge Learned Hand held 
that the probability of something going wrong was high in a busy port and the burden 
placed on the bargee to attend to the barge was not onerous but reasonable, and the 
. bargee had breached his duty of care by leaving the barge unattended. 
Take another example. A locomotive emits sparks causing potential damage to a farmers 
property of $375. The damage can be corrected by a spark arrester, $150, or the removal 
of the farmers property from the railroad for $250. Clearly the efficient solution is the 
purchase of the spark arrester by either party. If, in a tort action, the railroad company was 
found liable, it would compensate the farmer by the payment of his losses and the purchase 
of a spark arrester to prevent future losses. This was illustrated in Bank of New Zealand v 
Greenwood105 where Hardie Boys J awarded the payment of blinds in order to avert the 
101 MacKaay, above n91, 66. 
102 (1947) 159 F 2d 169. 
103 J Palmer "Liability for Negligently Performed Financial Services: An Economic Theory" (1996) 26 
VUWLR 71, 74. 
104 MacKaay, above n91, 66. See generally AM Polinsky An Introduction to Law and Economics (2 ed, 
Little Brown & Co, Boston, 1989) 15-25. 
105 [1984] 1 NZLR 525. 
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reflection nuisance. Under economic rationale, the damages were awarded to the least-
cost avoider and is, in economic terms, an efficient outcome as the removal of the 
reflective verandah would have cost $20,000. Therefore, as mentioned, the function of 
tort damages is to provide incentives for parties to find the least-cost solution in order to 
minimise total costs of accidents to society, rather than for a court to impose the least-cost 
solution on the offender. Under economic rationale, the focus is not compensation but on 
the incentives to prevent costly inefficient accidents to society, and the awarding of 
tortious damages provides this incentive. 
C Misrepresentation and the Facts of Cox & Coxon lid 
The question remains, under economic rationale should expectation damages be available 
for misrepresentation under the Fair Trading Act? From the law and economic efficiency 
perspective, misrepresentation is inefficient due to imperfect information and carelessness 
in the exchange process, and therefore both parties do not perceive the exchange as 
mutually beneficial and will not maximise joint utility. Therefore, the representee has 
suffered detrimental reliance as the transaction does not take the resource to the highest 
valued use or utility, and is not socially optimal or Pareto efficient. 106 
Analysing the problem from a contractual perspective it is absurd to impose expectation 
damages as an implicit term of a misrepresentation. This is clearly the wrong analysis, for 
the representor's obligations to the buyer do not derive from any consensually assumed 
obligation, but of an obligation to aviod unreasonable conduct that violates the autonomy 
of another. 107 
Under economic rationale, the carelessness in the exchange process on behalf of the 
representor should be discouraged by taking cost-justified precautions. For example, 108 a 
106 This situation is not Pareto efficient because the representee can be made better off without making the 
representor worse off. 
107 M J Trebilcock The Limits of Freedom of Contract (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1993) 105. 
108 Posner, above n97, 127. This example is also used by Mackaay, above n91, 63. 
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commercial photographer has his Himalayan expedition film misplaced by the developer. 
Posner asks, firstly, who is better to take precautions, and secondly, whether the 
developer should be liable for the entire cost of the Himalayan expedition. Both the 
representor, by verifying the information conveyed, and the photographer, by requesting 
special handling or using two films, are the least-cost avoiders to take inexpensive or cost-
justified precautions against these contingencies. The burden of taking precautions is 
small, as opposed to the benefits or the costs associated with the loss of not taking 
precautions. Therefore, there is an incentive for the party with the knowledge of the risk 
to take precautions themselves, or make the risk known to the other party in order to 
prevent or insure the loss. 
However, if the developer were to be held liable for the full costs of the expedition, there 
would be an incentive to self-insure for such a contingency in the future resulting in an 
increased prices. Similiarly, if the representor were to be held liable to the generally higher 
expectation measure of damages, an incentive would be created that would induce socially 
wasteful investments by potential victims or representors in avoidance precautions, such as 
disclaimers or indemnity clauses. This could result in correct information given in the 
exchange process, but is more likely to result in unverified information given with 
disclaimers or possibly no information at all. These preventitive measures would result in 
the cost of deterring an accident becoming higher than that of the accident itself, an 
inefficent result as the law of torts functions only to deter uneconomical accidents, not 
economical accidents. In other words, it would be inefficient to expend more to prevent 
the accident, than the actual cost of the accident itself. 
The disincentives created by such a result would create such inefficiencies in the market 
that it would significantly impede the exchange process. It is clear that the view expressed 
by the majority is correct not only from a legal point of view, but an economic perspective 
as well. 
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V CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeal has made an authoritative statement that expectation damages are 
not available under the Fair Trading Act 1986, and has expressly disapproved statements 
to the contrary in Smythe and Crump v Wala. 109 The divided opinion in the Court shows 
that the issue is far from clear, although it is certain that Cox & Coxon Ltd will shape the 
future law of damages under the Act, unless a contrary view comes from a higher judicial 
h · 110 aut onty. 
A The Implications of Cox & Coxon Ltd 
Firstly, the blurred distinction between liability under the Fair Trading Act and the 
Contractual Remedies Act has been drawn to a sharp contrast. The purpose of the Fair 
Trading Act was to redress particular types of wrongs, not of imposing performance 
obligations, and can no longer be seen to make representations enforceable against a 
vendor than against an agent. Therefore, plaintiffs will have to take more care in 
distinguishing between causes of action under the Contractual Remedies Act and those 
under the Fair Trading Act. 
Secondly, because the tortious measure of damages requires an assessment of damages 
had the misleading conduct not occured, it is necessary to plead the position the plaintiff 
would have been, had there been no wrong by the defendant. The plaintiff will need to 
plead precisely what loss has been suffered and show how this was caused by the 
offending conduct. 111 Therefore, the Fair Trading Act has been moved into the area of 
statutory torts. 
109 Crump v Wala , above n2. 
11° Keene, above n73, 108. 
111 Beck, above n7, 99. 
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Thirdly, Beck argues, that the decision will "have the effect of stifling the flexible 
approach to remedies"
112 made possible by the Act, which contradicts the consumer 
protection objectives of the Act. This view negates the discretion given to judges by Henry 
and Blanchard JJ, who make it clear that awards can be made if evidence can be adduced 
to show that losses reflect a dimunition in the value of the bargain or other reliance losses 
of the plaintiff induced by the misleading conduct. 113 
Fourthly, although agents would welcome the outcome, the decision does not free agents 
from responsibility. It has been argued, originally directed toward Gates, that the person 
making a misleading statement has a vested interest in making it so misleading that the 
recipient makes no inquiries as to alternatives, and is unable to show that they could, and 
would, have entered into a different contract. 114 Equally however, the more misleading the 
conduct the less likely loss or damage will be suffered. In economic terms, no misleading 
or deceptive conduct is efficient in the market, but a decision contrary to Cox & Coxon 
Ltd would create such inefficiencies that information from agents would always be given 
with a disclaimer, or possibly, not at all. The Cox & Coxon Ltd decision will allow access 
of timely information and expertise whilst also providing a balance of redress for 
inaccurate information or misleading conduct. 
112 Beck, above n7, 99. 
113 Keene, above n73, 108. 
114 Brookers Gault on Commrecial Law (Brookers, Wellington, 1999) 2-188(a). 
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